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NOTES

LIMITING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 1946
CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION

O

n April 17, 1984, demonstrators gathered outside the
Libyan People’s Bureau in London to protest the practices of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s regime.1 Officials of the
British government had been forewarned that if the demonstration was allowed to take place, Libya “‘would not be responsible
for its consequences.’”2 Suddenly, during the demonstration,
machine gunfire erupted.3 Shots were fired from inside the
Libyan embassy toward the crowd.4 Constable Yvonne Fletcher
was killed, and eleven others injured.5 This tragedy led to the
severing of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom
and Libya.6 No one was ever prosecuted.7
This incident at the Libyan embassy illustrates how diplomatic immunity shields the culpable from liability. While most
scholars agree that some form of diplomatic immunity is necessary, the doctrine has historically been criticized. This is because diplomats enjoy absolute immunity for their official and

1. Rosalyn Higgins, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities:
Recent United Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 641, 643 (1985).
2. Id.
3. Joshua D. Groff, A Proposal for Diplomatic Accountability Using the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: The Decline of an Absolute
Sovereign Right, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 209, 218 (2000).
4. Id.
5. GRANT V. MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES,
PROBLEMS 6 (1989).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 8.
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private acts while on assignment in the receiving state.8 Commentators have suggested numerous ways to curb this absolute
immunity. These suggestions include, inter alia, creating a
permanent international diplomatic court,9 restricting or
amending the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,10
and creating compensation funds and mandatory insurance so
that the injured have recourse.11
This Note will suggest that absolute immunity is unnecessary
and undesirable. It will propose limiting immunity to only
those acts required for a diplomat to fulfill his official functions.
It will show that the functional necessity theory of immunity
has been successful in its application to the privileges and immunities of officials working in international organizations,
such as the United Nations (“UN”). It will argue that functional
immunity should be applied to diplomats rather than absolute
immunity. Further, it will propose that an additional Protocol
to the Vienna Convention be drafted allowing states to execute
bilateral agreements limiting the immunity of their diplomats
to functional immunity. Finally it will argue that for these
agreements to be truly effective they must provide waiver and
settlement options similar to those used in the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the UN.12 These options
would make diplomats accountable for both criminal and civil
wrongs.
Part II of this Note will provide background on diplomatic
immunity, including its history, theoretical underpinnings,
codification, and cases of abuse. Part III will provide an overview of the international privileges and immunities enjoyed by
officials of the UN. In addition, Part III will focus on the waiver
and settlement features of the UN Convention. Part IV will
8. See generally J. CRAIG BARKER, THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES
IMMUNITIES: A NECESSARY EVIL? (1996). The sending state is the diplomat’s home state and the receiving state is the foreign country where the diplomat is assigned.
9. Groff, supra note 3, at 222-23.
10. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 8, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Lori J. Shapiro, Foreign Relations Law: Modern Developments in Diplomatic Immunity, 1989
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 281, 295.
11. Groff, supra note 3, at 220-21.
12. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 16 [hereinafter UN Convention].
AND
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compare the immunities of diplomats to those of their international counterparts and will argue that diplomatic immunity
should be limited to acts necessary to carry out the diplomat’s
official functions. Finally, this Note will propose methods for
enforcing the functional theory of diplomatic immunity.
II. BACKGROUND ON DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
A. Practical Justifications for Diplomatic Immunity
On November 4, 1979 the American embassy in Tehran was
seized by armed students and the entire staff of the embassy
was held hostage.13 The gunmen demanded that the United
States (“U.S.”) extradite the Shah and apologize for its involvement in internal Iranian politics over the past several decades.14
The Iranian government took no action to help gain the release
of the hostages, and the Iranian minister in charge of supervising the embassy commented that, “‘this occupation is certainly
positive.’”15 The last hostages were released after 444 days in
captivity.16
The U.S. filed a claim before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).17 In its judgment of May 24, 1980 the Court held:
13. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 8.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 8–9.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 9–10. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations. Its seat is at the Peace Palace in The Hague
(Netherlands). . . . It operates under a Statute largely similar to that
of its predecessor, which is an integral part of the Charter of the
United Nations. . . . The Court has a dual role: to settle in accordance
with international law the legal disputes submitted to it by States,
and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly
authorized international organs and agencies . . . only States may
apply to and appear before the Court. The States Members of the
United Nations (at present numbering 189), and one State which is
not a Member of the United Nations but which has become party to
the Court's Statute (Switzerland), are so entitled . . . . The Court decides in accordance with international treaties and conventions in
force, international custom, the general principles of law and, as subsidiary means, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists.
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[T]he Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall . . . afford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United
States the protection, privileges and immunities to which they
are entitled under the treaties in force between the two States,
and under general international law, including immunity from
any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to
leave the territory of Iran. . . .18

Diplomatic immunity has been described as a “necessary
evil.”19 The above example illustrates the need to retain parts
of the doctrine, especially those parts that provide physical protection to diplomatic personnel. The main rationale for providing diplomatic immunity is that the individual must be allowed
to perform his functions freely and independently without fearing political persecution by the receiving state.20 Another argument put forth is that diplomatic immunity is necessary for
the efficient functioning of the diplomatic process.21 A further
benefit of diplomatic immunity is that it is reciprocal.22 Reciprocity permits governments to extend diplomatic privileges and
immunities because these governments expect the same will be
done for their personnel.23
While these are all practical justifications for the doctrine of
diplomatic immunity, they still do not support absolute immunity. For example, does it make sense to prevent civil suits by
private individuals, where there is no intention on that individual’s part to interfere with the free and independent functions
of the diplomat? How do legitimate criminal prosecutions interfere with the diplomatic process? Why not limit the diplomat’s
immunity to those acts which are necessary for the exercise of
official functions, instead of shielding them from civil and
criminal liability?

ICJ, Homepage, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/
icjgnnot.html.
18. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3, 7 (May 24).
19. BARKER, supra note 8, at 219.
20. See id. at 224.
21. Id. at 225.
22. See CLIFTON E. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 32
(1967).
23. See id. at 32.
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B. Diplomatic Immunity Defined
Diplomatic immunity is the protection enjoyed by diplomats
in a receiving state while representing the sending state.24 The
scope of diplomatic immunity differs for different levels of diplomatic personnel.25 This Note will focus on the diplomatic staff
defined in Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.26 Diplomats classified in the “head of mission” category enjoy absolute immunity, with some exceptions.27 These
diplomats are immune for both private acts and acts carried out
within the scope of their official functions.28 Such diplomats
24. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 1.
25. A diplomatic agent is a “national representative in one of four categories: 1) ambassadors, 2) envoys and ministers plenipotentiary, 3) ministers
residents accredited to the sovereign, 4) charges d’affaires accredited to the
minister of foreign affairs.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 64 (7th ed. 1999).
26. The Vienna Convention classifies diplomatic personnel based on their
individual functions. Article 1 states:
For the purpose of the present Convention, the following expressions
shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them:
(a) the “head of the mission” is the person charged by the sending
State with the duty of acting in that capacity;
(b) the “members of the mission” are the head of the mission and the
members of the staff of the mission;
(c) the “members of the staff of the mission” are the members of the
diplomatic staff, of the administrative and technical staff and of the
service staff of the mission;
(d) the “members of the diplomatic staff” are the members of the staff
of the mission having diplomatic rank;
(e) a “diplomatic agent” is the head of the mission or a member of the
diplomatic staff of the mission;
(f) the “members of the administrative and technical staff” are the
members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative
and technical service of the mission;
(g) the “members of the service staff” are the members of the staff of
the mission in the domestic service of the mission;
(h) a “private servant” is a person who is in the domestic service of a
member of the mission and who is not an employee of the sending
State.
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 1.
27. See id. art. 31.
28. Id.
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are, therefore, typically immune from both criminal and civil
violations of the law.29
C. Traditional Theoretical Justifications for Diplomatic Immunity
The three main traditional theoretical justifications for diplomatic immunity are: (1) extraterritoriality, (2) personal representation, and (3) functional necessity.30 While parts of each
theory taken collectively can be used to justify absolute immunity,31 each one taken individually fails to justify why diplomats
require immunity for both private and official acts.
1. Extraterritoriality
The theory of extraterritoriality suggests that the property of
a diplomat and the person of the diplomat are to be treated as if
they exist on the territory of the sending state.32 Because the
diplomat is considered to be living in the sending state, he remains immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the
receiving state.33 This theory is ironic, considering that the diplomat would not be immune for the same illegal conduct if committed in the sending state. Not surprisingly, this theory has
been described as a legal fiction,34 and has fallen out of favor,
th
but was the dominant theory during much of the 18 Century.35
Critics view it as too expansive because it prevents states from
restricting the privileges and immunities of diplomats.36 In

29. See EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 229 (Clarendon Press 1998) (1976).
30. Groff, supra note 3, at 215.
31. WILSON, supra note 22, at 5.
32. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 30.
33. Stephen L. Wright, Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for Amending the
Vienna Convention to Deter Violent Criminal Acts, 5 B.U. INT’L L.J. 177, 19697 (1987).
34. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 6 (quoting Justice O’Gorman in George
Wilson v. Fuzman Blanco, 52 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 582 (1889), that extraterritoriality
“derives support from the legal fiction that an ambassador is not an inhabitant of the country to which he is accredited, but of the country of his origin
and whose sovereign he represents, and within whose territory, in contemplation of the law, he always resides”).
35. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 9; Wright, supra note 33, at 198–200.
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mats.36 In short, the theory of extraterritoriality is viewed as
excessive.37
2. Personal Representation
The personal representation theory is premised on the idea
that the diplomat is a representative of a sovereign state, and
that as the representative he is entitled to the same privileges
as the sovereign.38 Under this theory the diplomat is viewed as
the personification of the head of the sending state.39 This theory, like extraterritoriality, is not widely accepted in modern
diplomatic practice.40 It is criticized because in many states
there is no longer a monarchy and sovereignty has been transferred to the people and their elected officials.41 Because “the
people” do not enjoy immunity from prosecution in foreign
states, their representatives should not either.42 In addition,
the personal representation theory offers no justification for
why diplomats should be immune from jurisdiction for their
private acts.43 Thus, the theory of personal representation also
fails a modern application.
3. Functional Necessity
Functional necessity is the most accepted theory for the justification of diplomatic immunity.44 Under this theory, privileges
and immunities should be limited to those necessary for the
diplomat to carry out his official functions.45 The approach is
justified by arguing that diplomats could not fulfill their roles
without certain privileges and immunities.46 Proponents of this
36. See Wright, supra note 33, at 199.
37. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 10 (quoting Trenta v. Ragonesi, Italy
1938).
38. Groff, supra note 3, at 215–16.
39. Id.
40. WILSON, supra note 22, at 4.
41. Id.
42. See Groff, supra note 3, at 216.
43. Id.;WILSON, supra note 22, at 4.
44. Wright, supra note 33, at 200–04; Groff, supra note 3, at 216;
MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 32.
45. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 32.
46. Leslie Shirin Farhangi, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1521 (1986).
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theory suggest that it is dynamic and contains safeguards preventing the needless expansion of privileges and immunities.47
Indeed, functional necessity has been acknowledged in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,48 the international
instrument governing diplomatic relations.49 This doctrine is
unique, unlike its historical antecedents, because it provides
some rational basis for restricting the immunity of diplomats,
as long as the restrictions do not hinder the diplomat from accomplishing his functions.50 However, functional necessity has
not been carried to its logical conclusion in the diplomatic context. Perhaps this is because states are fearful that their diplomats would face unjust political prosecution or be rendered
unduly cautious in carrying out their functions. Thus, diplomats still enjoy absolute immunity for their private acts, even
though a truly functional approach would not support this degree of immunity. This theory, however, has been proven viable
under the UN Convention.
While functional immunity is the most accepted theory of diplomatic immunity, it is not without its shortcomings. For example, if functional necessity was fully implemented in the diplomatic context, who determines what constitutes an official
function? Would all official acts be covered?51 Once immunity is
limited to covering official acts, would other immunities be further eroded? These are questions with potential solutions, and
therefore, the theory of functional necessity presents the best
opportunity for limiting diplomatic immunity.

47. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 17; MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 32;
Faranghi, supra note 45, at 1522; Wright, supra note 33, at 202–03.
48. See Groff, supra note 3, at 216–17; Farhangi, supra note 46, at 1521;
Wright, supra note 33, at 202-03.
49. While the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations acknowledges
the theory of functional immunity it still provides for absolute immunity for
certain classes of diplomatic personnel.
50. Farhangi, supra note 46, at 1522.
51. For example, if a diplomat was returning home from an official function, but was inebriated and killed someone, would this be an official act or an
unofficial act? See Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31 (City Court
of New Rochelle 1946).
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D. History of Diplomatic Immunity
Diplomatic law is one of the oldest branches of international
law.52 Over time, necessity forced most states to provide envoys
basic protections; otherwise no international political system
could exist.53 The oldest records detailing actual diplomatic
practice emerged in the Greek city-states over 2,000 years ago.54
The doctrine of diplomatic immunity continued to develop and
evolve throughout the Roman and Byzantine Empires, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance and Classical periods.55 Initially,
much of diplomatic practice was based on custom.56 Eventually,
these customs became rights, and the issue of whether diplomats should be entitled to such rights became a legal question.57
As a result, much of diplomatic practice required codification
and was documented in international treaties, allowing states
to rely on these agreements for the protection of their envoys.58
These efforts to codify diplomatic law culminated at the 1961
Vienna Conference, which ultimately led to the drafting of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.59 In 1953, by General Assembly Resolution 685,60 The International Law Commission (“ILC”)61 was asked to undertake the codification of dip52. BARKER, supra note 8, at 14.
53. LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY 3 (1999).
54. Groff, supra note 3, at 213.
55. Groff, supra note 3, at 213. See also BARKER, supra note 8, at 14–25
(discussing the evolution of diplomatic immunity).
56. BARKER, supra note 8, at 29.
57. See FREY & FREY, supra note 53, at 4.
58. See id. See also BARKER, supra note 8, at 29-31 (describing the adoption of the Regulation of Cambridge by the Institute of International Law in
1895, which was the first formal attempt to codify diplomatic law: attempted
codifications by the American Institute of International Law took place in
1925; later The Havana Convention was drafted; The Institute of International Law’s revision of the 1895 Regulation occurred in 1929; and the Draft
Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities created by Harvard Law
School took place in 1932).
59. BARKER, supra note 8, at 30.
60. G.A. Res. 685, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 62, U.N. Doc.
A/2361 (1952).
61. A description of the work of the International Law Commission is provided on the United Nations website.
The International Law Commission was established by the General
Assembly in 1947 to promote the progressive development of interna-
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lomatic law.62 Mr. A.E.F. Sandstrom was appointed Special
Rapporteur, and was responsible for drafting a report on the
issue, which was later submitted to the ILC for review.63 The
ILC then adopted a provisional set of draft articles and commentaries.64 These drafts were submitted to all Member States
of the General Assembly for review and input. 65 After receiving
input from twenty-one Member States, the draft was amended
and a final draft of the Vienna Convention was submitted to the
General Assembly.66
E. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was signed
on April 18, 196167 and entered into force on April 24, 1964.68 It
is the seminal treaty governing diplomatic relations.69 The Vienna Convention contains fifty-three articles that govern the
behavior of diplomats, thirteen of which address the issue of
immunity.70 The preamble of the Vienna Convention acknowledges the theory of functional necessity.71 It states that the
tional law and its codification. The Commission, which meets annually, is composed of 34 members who are elected by the General Assembly for five year terms and who serve in their individual capacity,
not as representatives of their Governments. Most of the Commission's work involves the preparation of drafts on topics of international law. Some topics are chosen by the Commission and others referred to it by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social
Council. When the Commission completes draft articles on a particular topic, the General Assembly usually convenes an international
conference of plenipotentiaries to incorporate the draft articles into a
convention which is then open to States to become parties.
International Law Commission, Introduction (1998), at http://www.un.org/
law/ilc/introfra.htm
62. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
[1958] 2 Y.B. Int’l. Comm’n ¶ 45, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1.
63. Id. ¶ 46.
64. Id. ¶ 47.
65. Id. ¶ 48.
66. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. One more round of changes was made to the draft, and it
was later adopted.
67. See Vienna Convention, supra note 10.
68. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 44.
69. BARKER, supra note 8, at 30.
70. Groff, supra note 3, at 214.
71. See Groff, supra note 3, at 216–17; Farhangi, supra note 46, at 1521;
Wright, supra note 33, at 202–03.
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purpose of the Convention is “the development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems,” and that the purpose of providing
privileges and immunities “is not to benefit individuals but to
ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic
missions as representing States.”72 While it recognizes that
immunity is not for the personal benefit of the diplomat, it stops
short of fully adopting the theory of functional necessity.
1. Overview of Relevant Articles of the Convention
The Vienna Convention sets forth a system of diplomatic
privileges and immunities based on (1) the functions of the diplomat,73 (2) the premises used by the diplomat,74 (3) taxation

72. Vienna Convention preambular paragraphs state:
Recalling that peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplomatic agents, Having in mind the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the
sovereign equality of States, the maintenance of international peace
and security, and the promotion of friendly relations among nations,
Believing that an international convention on diplomatic intercourse,
privileges and immunities would contribute to the development of
friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems, Realizing that the purpose of such
privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as
representing States, Affirming that the rules of customary international law should continue to govern questions not expressly regulated by the provisions of the present Convention . . . .
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, preambular paragraphs.
73. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention
states:
1. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist, inter alia, in:
(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State;
(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending
State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law;
(c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments
in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government
of the sending State;
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and inspections,75 (4) the person of the diplomat,76 and (5) dip(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and
the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and
scientific relations.
2. Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as preventing the performance of consular functions by a diplomatic mission.
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.
74. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47. Vienna Convention Article 22
states:
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the
receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the
head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate
steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or
damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or
impairment of its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property
thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune
from search, requisition, attachment or execution.
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 22. See also id. art. 30 (“1. The private
residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission. 2. His papers, correspondence and, except
as provided in paragraph 3 of article 31, his property, shall likewise enjoy
inviolability.”)
75. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47. Vienna Convention Article 34
states:
A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal
or real, national, regional or municipal, except:
(a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in
the price of goods or services;
(b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the
sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(c) estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving
State, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of article 39;
(d) dues and taxes on private income having its source in the receiving State and capital taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in the receiving State;
(e) charges levied for specific services rendered;
(f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp
duty, with respect to immovable property, subject to the provisions of article 23.
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lomatic records and communications.77 Several articles are relevant to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomats
under the Vienna Convention. The most relevant article relating to immunity is Article 31.78 Under Article 31, a diplomat
receives complete immunity from criminal jurisdiction and partial immunity from civil jurisdiction.79 Pursuant to Article 31,
the diplomat loses civil immunity in three situations: (1) when
there is a dispute over immovable property in the receiving
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 34.
76. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47. Vienna Convention art. 29 states:
“The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to
any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due
respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.”
77. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47. Article 24 of the Vienna Convention
24 states: “The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviola-

ble at any time and wherever they may be.” Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 24.
78. Vienna Convention Article 31 states:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its
civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated
in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf
of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent
is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside
his official functions.
2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.
3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic
agent except in the cases coming under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and
(c) of paragraph 1 of this article, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person
or of his residence.
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State.
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 31.
79. Id.
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state; (2) if the diplomat is acting as an administrator, executor,
heir, or legatee in his capacity as a private person; or (3) if the
diplomat undertakes a commercial or professional activity
which is not part of his official functions.80
2. Additional Limits to Diplomatic Immunity
There are additional limits to diplomatic immunity imposed
by other articles of the Vienna Convention and by the sending
state. These include, inter alia, waiver, designation of persona
non grata, and sending state jurisdiction over its own diplomats.81 These limits, however, are inadequate. While they may
provide a way to address problematic diplomatic conduct, they
do not provide the injured with recourse.
Under Article 32, a diplomat may be subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state’s courts if the sending state expressly
waives the diplomat’s immunity.82 Negotiation for waiver seldom occurs because the sending state has no affirmative duty to
waive immunity, but has the option to do so.83 If waiver is

80. Id. See also DENZA, supra note 29, at 237–38, 245–50 (discussing in
detail the exceptions related to private immovable property, private involvement in succession, and professional and commercial activity).
81. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 126–37.
82. Vienna Convention Article 32 states:
1. The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons
enjoying immunity under article 37 may be waived by the sending
State.
2. Waiver must always be express.
3. The initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or by a person
enjoying immunity from jurisdiction under article 37 shall preclude
him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any
counter-claim directly connected with the principal claim.
4. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity in
respect of the execution of the judgment, for which a separate waiver
shall be necessary.
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 32. See also Farhangi, supra note 46,
at 1522; DENZA, supra note 29, at 273–88 (discussing waiver of immunity).
83. See Shapiro, supra note 10, at 285–86. See also MCCLANAHAN, supra
note 5, at 137–38 (discussing waiver of immunity).
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granted, it is often done under benign circumstances.84 For example, a state may grant a waiver for a diplomat or dependant
to testify in court on behalf of another.85 The state, however,
would probably not grant a waiver if that same diplomat or dependent were subpoenaed to testify in court because of their
own criminal wrongdoing.86 In reality, waiver is not an effective
way of limiting diplomatic immunity because states have an
interest in protecting their diplomats from the effect of a
waiver.87
Pursuant to Article 9, a diplomat may be declared persona
non grata by the receiving state. 88 Once this designation has
been made the sending state must recall the diplomat or terminate his functions in the sending state.89 The declaration of
persona non grata is usually reserved for behavior such as espionage, terrorism, or other subversive activity, but can be used
in other circumstances.90
Article 9 also provides a significant legal restraint on absolute immunity.91 However, because the diplomat can be re84. See DENZA, supra note 29, at 287 (describing U.S. State Department
practice on waiver of diplomatic immunity); MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at
137.
85. See DENZA, supra note 29, at 287; MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 137.
86. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 137.
87. Shapiro, supra note 10, at 285.
88. Vienna Convention Article 9 states:
1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain
its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or
any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non
grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the
mission. A person may be declared non grata or not acceptable before
arriving in the territory of the receiving State.
2. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to
carry out its obligations under paragraph 1 of this article, the receiving State may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a member
of the mission.
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 9. See also MCCLANAHAN, supra note
5, at 126–30 (describing the persona non grata doctrine); DENZA, supra note
29, at 59–71 (chronicling the practice of Article 9).
89. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 9(1).
90. See DENZA, supra note 29, at 63–67.
91. See id. at 62.
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called to the sending state, immunity is usually preserved. If
the sending state chooses to terminate the functions of the diplomat in the receiving state, then the diplomat is no longer
shielded by immunity.92
Another supposed limit to diplomat immunity is that diplomats may face the jurisdiction of their national courts for
wrongs committed in the receiving state.93 While the threat of
potential prosecution by their own state may serve to encourage
diplomats to respect the law of the receiving state,94 a sending
state is not required to prosecute its diplomatic personnel who
have committed violent crimes or civil wrongs.95 More importantly, in the civil context, potential claimants are unlikely to
have success in pursuing the claim in the sending state.96 It is
unlikely that a claimant would be able to successfully serve
process on the diplomat, or be able to sustain the costs of litigating the claim in the foreign country.97 Thus, this is not a viable
alternative for those who have been seriously injured.
3. Settlement under The Vienna Convention
The Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,98 provides for the settlement of disputes arising out of the

92. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 128.
93. Id. at 136.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. DENZA, supra note 29, at 265–66.
97. Id.
98. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3374, 500 U.N.T.S. 241 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. The Optional Protocol
states:
The States Parties to the present Protocol and to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Convention’, adopted by the United Nations Conference held at Vienna from
2 March to 14 April 1961,
Expressing their wish to resort in all matters concerning them in respect of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of
the Convention to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, unless some other form of settlement has been
agreed upon by the parties within a reasonable period,
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interpretation of the Vienna Convention. Disputes are to be
heard by the ICJ.99 While this is a valid attempt to provide a
forum where states can bring claims arising out of breaches of
the Vienna Convention,100 it does not provide settlement options
for individuals who are injured as a result of diplomatic misconduct. Moreover, the ICJ typically only hears cases involving
severe breaches of the Vienna Convention.101 The Court is not
the most efficient way of addressing breaches of the Vienna
Convention because most issues that arise must be resolved
more expeditiously, usually at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.102
F. Cases of Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity
Some diplomats have abused their immunity by committing
criminal and civil wrongs. The most stereotypical abuse is in
connection with parking tickets and other minor motor vehicle

Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the
Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a
Party to the present Protocol.
....
Article III
1. Within the same period of two months, the parties may agree to
adopt a conciliation procedure before resorting to the International
Court of Justice.
2. The conciliation commission shall make its recommendations
within five months after its appointment. If its recommendations are
not accepted by the parties to the dispute within two months after
they have been delivered, either party may bring the dispute before
the Court by an application.
Id.
99. See id. art. I.
100. See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S.
v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24); The Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2000 I.C.J. 182, (Dec. 8) (for examples
of States bringing claims arising out of the Vienna Convention to the ICJ).
101. See id.
102. DENZA, supra note 29, at 421.
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offenses.103 These, however, are among the least egregious
types of offenses.104 Abuse often extends to serious breaches of
state and federal law, including, inter alia, drunk driving, drug
smuggling, and other acts of physical violence.105
One recent example is the case of Ahmed v. Hoque.106 The
plaintiff, a domestic servant of the defendant, the Economics
Minister for the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to
the UN, claimed that he had been enslaved and assaulted in
violation of New York State law, federal law, and international
treaties and conventions.107 The plaintiff was brought to the
U.S. to work in the home of the defendant and his wife, and was
paid only $20 per month.108 The plaintiff often worked fifteen
hour days and was allotted approximately two hours of free
time per day.109 The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant
pushed him to the ground causing him to cut his hand.110 The
defendant claimed diplomatic immunity.111 The court dismissed
the complaint, allowing the defendant to successfully assert his
privilege and avoid compensating the plaintiff for his injuries.112

103. Michael Cooper, More Diplomatic Parking Causes Some to Grumble,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1997, at B3; Bob Minzesheimer, Delinquent Diplomats:
Soviets Rank First In Unpaid Parking Tickets, WASH. POST MAG., Feb. 20,
1983, at 11; Eduardo Cue, Diplomat Parking Tickets Put at 80 Per Cent Unpaid, WASH. POST, May 5, 1977, at B5.
104. These minor, but repeated offenses, nonetheless evidence a systematic
disregard for the laws of the receiving state. It should be noted that even
these minor offenses cost local municipalities significant sums of money.
105. Michael B. McDonough, Privileged Outlaws: Diplomats, Crime and
Immunity, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 475, 488 (1997).
106. Ahmed v. Hoque, 2002 WL 1964806 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002).
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2. Ahmed claimed that Hoque’s immunity was governed by the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and not
the Vienna Convention. Hence, Ahmed claimed that Hoque was acting outside the scope of his functions, and therefore should not be entitled to immunity. The court noted that under Article IV, Section 11 of the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, representatives of Member States like Hoque, unlike employees of the UN, enjoy the same level of
immunity as diplomats under the Vienna Convention.
112. Id. at 8.
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Another example is Tabion v. Mufti, which illustrates how
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention functions in practice.113 In
this case, a domestic servant sued her employer, who was First
Secretary at the Embassy of Jordan to the U.S.114 The domestic
servant alleged, inter alia, breach of her employment contract,
false imprisonment, and race discrimination.115 She also alleged that the defendant paid her only 50¢ per hour and confiscated her passport.116 The defendant filed a motion to quash,
claiming diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention.117
The plaintiff opposed the motion under Article 31(1)(c),118 arguing that “a diplomatic agent shall not be immune from civil actions ‘relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside of
his official functions.’”119 The plaintiff contended that her employment relationship with the defendant constituted a “commercial activity” within the meaning of Article 31, and therefore
the defendant was not immune from suit.120 The district court,
while noting that the outcome might be perceived as unjust,
held that the plaintiff’s employment relationship was not
“commercial activity” within the meaning ascribed by Article
31.121 The plaintiff appealed the judgment, but the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.122 Thus, the court
113. Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d 73 F.3d 535
(4th Cir. 1996).
114. Id. at 286.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 287.
118. Vienna Convention, supra note 74, art. 31.
119. Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 287 (quoting Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna
Convention).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 292.
122. Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996). The court stated that:
It is evident from the foregoing authorities that the phrase “commercial activity,” as it appears in the Article 31(1)(c) exception, was intended by the signatories to mean “commercial activity exercised by
the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.” Day-to-day living services such as dry cleaning or domestic
help were not meant to be treated as outside a diplomat's official
functions. Because these services are incidental to daily life, diplomats are to be immune from disputes arising out of them.
Id. at 538–39.
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preserved the immunity of the defendant, leaving the plaintiff
without a remedy.
In Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, the plaintiff had
been shot by the grandson of the ambassador of Brazil to the
U.S.123 The grandson asserted diplomatic immunity under the
Vienna Convention, and the court dismissed the complaint.124
This situation underscores one of the more serious flaws of the
Vienna Convention. Pursuant to Article 37, the extended family of the diplomat is protected from legal process, and thus is
able to escape prosecution by virtue of his or her relationship to
the diplomat.125 Under no circumstances does the theory of
functional immunity support the extension of immunity to the
family of diplomatic personnel.
Yet another example is the story of Alexander Kashin, a Russian citizen who was paralyzed from the neck down when a car
driven by an American diplomat broadsided his car.126 Because
the incident occurred in Russia, where the American envoy was
stationed, he asserted diplomatic immunity and avoided the
jurisdiction of Russian courts.127 Kashin has moved to the U.S.
to pursue litigation against the American envoy, but thus far to
no avail.128 The Kashin example is just one of many of these
kinds of incidents, most of which are reported by the media, but
which never get fully litigated, if at all.129
123. Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (D.C.
1983).
124. Id. at 1416. See also Aldi v. Yaron, 672 F. Supp. 516 (D.C. 1987) (holding that former Brigadier General was entitled to diplomatic immunity for
action taken by him as a general once he became an attaché in embassy in the
U.S.).
125. See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 37 (“The members of the
family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are
not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in articles 29 to 36.”). These privileges and immunities include immunity
from criminal and civil jurisdiction.
126. Tom Jackman, Judge Moves Russian’s Suit Against U.S. Diplomat,
WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2002, at A17.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See also Matt Nixson, Foreign Envoys Get Away With Crime — And
Owe Britain GBP 1.5m, MAIL ON SUNDAY, July 21, 2002, at 11 (exposing that
British diplomats have escaped criminal prosecution on twenty-one separate
occasions by hiding behind the cloak of diplomatic immunity); Catherine Wilson, Saudi Prince Used Diplomatic Cover To Smuggle Tons of Cocaine, DEA
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Unsurprisingly, it is this type of misconduct that elicits moral
outrage by the public and suggests that there must be a limit to
diplomatic immunity. By restricting the immunity to only official acts, these types of cases would be fully litigated and the
injured would at least have some hope of being compensated for
their losses.
III. BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES
International immunity describes the immunity enjoyed by
international organizations and their personnel.130 This Note
will focus on officials of the UN. Articles 104131 and 105132 of the
UN Charter provide the framework for the development of the

Says, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 18, 2002, at A7 (describing how a Saudi Prince
used his diplomatic immunity to smuggle 4,400 pounds of cocaine on his private jet from Venezuela to Paris); Andrea Perry & Tim Shipman, Political
Storm Erupts as Suspects Claim Diplomatic Immunity; Embassy Staff Evade
Quiz Over Murder, SUNDAY EXPRESS, May 26, 2002, at 6 (describing how two
Colombian diplomats refused to be questioned in connection with the murder
of a young British father); Pamela Ferdinand, Law Deposed in Pedophilia
Case; Prelate Says He Does Not Recall Letters Warning About Convicted
Priest, WASH. POST, May 9, 2002, at A2 (suggesting that Cardinal Law might
try to flee to Rome because he has dual citizenship with the Vatican and could
claim diplomatic immunity, thereby avoiding testifying in pedophilia cases).
130. PETER H.F. BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS: A FUNCTIONAL NECESSITY ANALYSIS OF THEIR LEGAL STATUS
AND IMMUNITIES 153 (1994).
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 104 (“The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of
each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise
of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.”).
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 1–3.
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials
of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the Organization.
3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to
determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United
Nations for this purpose.
Id.
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privileges and immunities of the organization and its officials.133
International immunities of UN officials are premised on functional necessity as articulated in Article 105(2) of the UN Charter.134
On February 13, 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN.135 This
Convention set forth the system of privileges and immunities of
the organization, to more fully define the concept of privileges
and immunities characterized in the Charter.136
A. The History Of International Immunity
th

International immunities first appeared during the 19 Century, even though the development of international organizations did not begin to drastically increase until the post World
War II period.137 Initially, many of the international organizations that were established, such as the International Postal
Union, did not require privileges and immunities because they
did not have a political mandate, and therefore the rationale for
immunity did not exist.138 When international organizations
began to emerge that did serve a political function, many
granted officials diplomatic immunity because it offered a convenient model.139 This misapplication of diplomatic immunity
to officials working in international organizations created doctrinal confusion, because the international official’s primary
duty was to represent the organization, not their home state. 140

133. See generally THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY
1314–25 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002) (1994) [hereinafter THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS].
134. See id. at 1317.
135. U.N. Convention, supra note 12.
136. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS,
DOCUMENTS, APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, OF THE CONVENTION ON
THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 184, Sales No. 627
(1992) [hereinafter I.C.J. PLEADINGS].
137. See Charles H. Brower, II, International Immunities: Some Dissident
Views on the Role of Municipal Courts, 41 VA. J. INT’L. L. 1, 8-9 (2000). See also
C. WILFRED JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES 1–16 (1961) (providing a brief
history of international immunities).
138. Brower, supra note 137, at 9.
139. Id. at 11.
140. Id. at 16.
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This misapplication had a dual effect.141 First, international
officials were susceptible to pressure by their own state to work
toward the state’s interests rather than the international organization’s, and second, the extension of absolute immunity to
this category of individuals risked undermining their accountability for private acts.142
Recognizing the doctrinal confusion, the drafters of the UN
Charter sought to avoid this by categorically adopting functional, rather than diplomatic, immunities for the organization
and its officials.143 The drafting of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN was proposed by the Preparatory Commission of the UN.144 The Preparatory Commission
recommended to the General Assembly that it should propose
such a convention pursuant to Articles 104 and 105 of the UN
Charter.145 On February 13, 1946 the General Assembly, on the
advice and counsel of the Sixth (Legal) Committee and the SubCommittee on Privileges and Immunities, adopted Resolution 6
which approved the text of the Convention and proposed it for
accession by Member States.146
B. The 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
UN
Pursuant to Article 105 of the UN Charter, the UN Convention, unlike the Vienna Convention, limits the privileges and
immunities of UN officials to those that are “necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the
Organization.”147 Thus, the theory of functional necessity is
carried to its logical conclusion in the UN Convention.148 By
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 16–18.
144. I.C.J. PLEADINGS, supra note 136, at 184.
145. Id. After recommending that the General Assembly propose such a
convention, the Preparatory Commission proposed draft text of the convention
and submitted it to the General Assembly. The General Assembly then referred it to the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the Assembly, which then referred
it to the Sub-Committee on Privileges and Immunities.
146. G.A. Res. 6, at 26–28, Feb. 13, 1946.
147. U.N. CHARTER art. 105(1). See also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 133, at 1314–25.
148. Although functional immunity is granted to officials of the UN, the
General Convention grants diplomatic immunity to the representatives of
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uniformly applying the functional approach to immunity, the
UN Convention prevents officials from abusing immunities for
personal benefit.149 Indeed, UN officials only have immunity for
acts undertaken in an official capacity.
Member States. This grant of diplomatic immunity to representatives of
Member States is one of the flaws of the Convention. Article IV, sec. 11
states:
Representatives of Members to the principal and subsidiary organs of
the United Nations and to conferences convened by the United Nations, shall, while exercising their functions and during the journey to
and from the place of meeting, enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
a. immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure
of their personal baggage, and, in respect of words spoken or
written and all acts done by them in their capacity as representatives, immunity from legal process of every kind;
b. inviolability for all papers and documents;
c. the right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence
by courier or in sealed bags;
d. exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses from
immigration restrictions, aliens registration or national service
obligations in the state they are visiting or through which they
are passing in the exercise of their functions;
e. the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to representatives of foreign governments
on temporary official missions;
f. the same immunities and facilities in respect of their personal
baggage as are accorded to diplomatic envoys, and also;
g. such other privileges, immunities and facilities not inconsistent with the foregoing as diplomatic envoys enjoy, except that
they shall have no right to claim exemption from customs duties
on goods imported (otherwise than as part of their personal baggage) or from exercise duties or sales taxes.
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. IV, sec. 11.
149. Id. art. V, sec. 20 states in part: “Privileges and immunities are
granted to officials in the interests of the UN and not for the personal benefit
of the individuals themselves. . . .” See also Statement by Secretary-General
Trygve Lie in The Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and
the International Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Their Status, Privileges
and Immunities: A Study Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.118
and Add.1 and 2, reprinted in [1967] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n ¶¶ 248–49 [hereinafter ILC Study (1967)] (“United Nations personnel do not enjoy immunity
from arrest or interrogation for alleged acts unrelated to their official duties
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1. Relevant Articles of the Convention
Under the UN Convention there are four groups that receive
immunity. The first group includes high level personnel, such
as the Secretary-General and Assistant Secretaries-General, as
well as representatives of Member States.150 These individuals
receive diplomatic immunity.151 The second, third, and fourth
categories include the organization itself, officials of the UN,
and experts on mission.152 These three groups have functional
immunity, rather than diplomatic immunity.153
For the purposes of this Note, Article V, Section 18 of the UN
Convention is the most relevant because it describes the immunity given to officials of the organizations.154 Under Section

which are unlawful in the Member States where they are committed or alleged to have been committed”); THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra
note 133, at 1320–22 (providing a broad overview of UN practice as it relates
to officials of the UN).
150. Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103, 109–10
(2002).
151. See UN Convention art. V, sec. 19; art. IV, sec. 11 (describing the diplomatic immunity of the Secretary-General and Assistant SecretariesGeneral, as well as the diplomatic immunity of Representatives of Member
States).
152. Rawski, supra note 150, at 110–11.
153. See generally UN Convention arts. I–III, V, VI (describing the functional immunity of the organization, its officials and its experts).
154. UN Convention art. V, sec. 18 states:
Officials of the United Nations shall:
a. be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or
written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity;
b. be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid
to them by the United Nations;
c. be immune from national service obligations;
d. be immune, together with their spouses and relatives dependent on them, from immigration restrictions and alien registration;
e. be accorded the same privileges in respect of exchange facilities as are accorded to the officials of comparable ranks forming
part of diplomatic missions to the Government concerned;
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18(a), officials are entitled to “be immune from legal process in
respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by
them in their official capacity.”155 This immunity is intended to
enable UN officials to accomplish the work of the organization
in an unrestricted fashion. According to UN practice “any act
which is performed by [UN] officials, experts or consultants
which is directly related to the mission or project, such as driving to and from a project site, would constitute prima facie an
official act within the meaning of Section 18(a).”156
Under the Convention, it is the Secretary-General, and not
local judicial authorities, who determine what constitutes an
official act for the purposes of asserting immunity.157 The ICJ

f. be given, together with their spouses and relatives dependent
on them, the same repatriation facilities in time of international
crisis as diplomatic envoys;
g. have the right to import free of duty their furniture and effects
at the time of first taking up their post in the country in question.
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. V, sec. 18. See also 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 223–24, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/14 (providing that UN salaries are not subject to garnishment, but that deductions from salaries
and allowances of staff members is permitted, in the Secretary General’s discretion, for debts to third parties); 1975 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 191–
92, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/12, 1984 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 185–86, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/22 (describing the Secretary-General’s discretionary authority to grant to a staff member special leave to complete military service in his/her own country under certain circumstances, but
noting that UN officials are exempt from military service). See generally THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 133, at 1320–21
(chronicling the practice of the United Nations as it relates to article V,
sec. 18 of the UN Convention); UNITED NATIONS, REPERTORY OF
PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS, Supp. 6, Volume VI, arts. 92–
105, 108-11, at 158–73, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.10 (1999) (providing UN
practice as it relates to article 105 of the UN Charter).
155. See UN Convention, supra note 151, art. V, sec. 18(a).
156. 1985 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 154–55, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/23.
157. 1995 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 403–04, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/33. See also
The Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Their Status, Privileges and Immunities: Supplementary Study Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.383 and Add. 1–3, 177 (recognizing that it is exclusively the right of
the Secretary-General and not national tribunals to determine what constitutes an official act). Under Article V, Section 20 of the Convention, the Secu-
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underscored the Secretary-General’s authority to assert immunity in one of its advisory opinions.158 The Court concluded that
the decisions of the Secretary-General regarding immunity are
to be given a presumption of validity, and that such a finding on
his part can only be “set aside for the most compelling reasons
and is thus to be given the greatest weight by national
courts.”159
Officials of the UN include all staff members of the UN, regardless of nationality, residence place of recruitment, or
rank.160 In addition, under Article VI, Section 22 experts on
mission for the UN are accorded privileges and immunities so
they may carry out the work they were hired to perform on behalf of the organization.161

rity Council has the authority to waive the immunity of the SecretaryGeneral.
158. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62, ¶ 60 (Apr. 29,
1999)
As the Court has observed, the Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, has the primary responsibility to safeguard the interests of the Organization; to that end, it is up
to him to assess whether its agents acted within the scope of their
functions and, where he so concludes, to protect these agents, including experts on mission, by asserting their immunity. This means
that the Secretary-General has the authority and responsibility to inform the Government of a member State of his finding and, where
appropriate, to request it to act accordingly and, in particular, to request it to bring his finding to the knowledge of the local courts if acts
of an agent have given or may give rise to court proceedings.
Id.; Rawski, supra note 150, at 112–13.
159. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29,
1999); Rawski, supra note 150, at 112–13.
160. G.A. Res. 76(1) at 189, Dec. 7, 1946. However, staff that are locally
recruited and assigned to hourly rates are not considered officials within the
definition.
161. UN Convention art. VI, sec. 22 states:
Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Article V)
performing missions for the United Nations shall be accorded such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions during the period of their missions, including
the time spent on journeys in connexion with their missions. In particular they shall be accorded:
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2. Case Law Demonstrating the Privileges and Immunities of
the UN
One of the first cases to test the system of privileges and immunities set out by the UN Charter was Westchester County v.
Ranollo.162 Ranollo, chauffer of then Secretary-General of the
UN, the Honorable Trygve Lie, was arrested for speeding while
driving the Secretary-General to an official UN conference.163
The court held that Ranollo was not acting in his official capacity and was therefore not immune from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.164 The UN strongly disagreed with this holding and
subsequent U.S. jurisprudence would suggest that, if the case
were tried today, Ranollo would be protected under the UN
Convention because he was acting in his official capacity. 165

a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure
of their personal baggage;
b) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in
the course of the performance of their mission, immunity from
legal process of every kind. This immunity from legal process
shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the persons
concerned are no longer employed on missions for the United Nations;
c) inviolability for all papers and documents;
d) for the purpose of their communications with the United Nations, the right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence by courrier or in sealed bags;
e) the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to representatives of foreign governments
on temporary official missions;
f) the same immunities and facilities in respect of their personal
baggage as are accorded to diplomatic envoys.
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. VI, sec. 22.
162. Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31 (City Court of New
Rochelle 1946).
163. Lawrence Preuss, Immunity of Officers and Employees of the United
Nations for Official Acts: The Ran[o]llo Case, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 555, 556
(1947).
164. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
165. See ILC Study (1967), supra note 149, ¶ 255 (describing the position of
the Secretariat vis-à-vis the Ranollo case).
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Another early case of functional immunity as applied by U.S.
courts was U.S. v. Coplon.166 Although at this time the U.S. had
not yet acceded to the UN Convention, it was a Member of the
UN and was bound by the provisions of Article 105 of the Charter.167 The defendant, a citizen of the Soviet Union and an employee of the UN, was charged with espionage.168 Although the
defendant asserted immunity, the court held that “unlawful
espionage is not a function of the defendant as an employee of
the UN.”169
In People v. Leo, the defendant, a Tanzanian national employed by the UN, was charged with assault and resisting arrest.170 He asserted immunity based on his UN employment.171
The court held against the defendant and distinguished between diplomatic immunity and the immunity enjoyed by UN
officials: “[Immunity] is limited in scope and purpose to protection for acts committed by UN officials in the course of accomplishing their functions as UN employees in distinction to the
unlimited form of immunity traditionally accorded diplomats.”172 The court went on to hold that “an analysis of the
facts in this case, in the most liberal perspective possible, fails
to demonstrate any basis whatsoever upon which to conclude
that defendant was acting in his official capacity or that there
was some reasonable relationship between the alleged altercation and defendant’s UN employment.”173
These cases illustrate that the functional approach announced in the UN Charter and used in the UN Convention
provides the injured with recourse.
166. U.S. v. Coplon, 84 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
167. Id. at 474.
168. Id. at 473.
169. Id. at 474. Cf. De Luca v. United Nations Organization, 41 F.3d 1502
(2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1051 (1995) (affirming the District
Court’s decision to uphold the immunity of the UN and individual UN officers
who were being sued for the alleged failure to reimburse the UN employee for
withheld income taxes); Askir v. Boutros-Ghali, 933 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that a UN official could not be held liable in an individual capacity for acts undertaken in an official capacity as set forth in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations).
170. People v. Leo, 407 N.Y.S.2d 941, 942 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 943.
173. Id.
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3. Waiver and Settlement under the UN Convention
There are two mechanisms provided for in the UN Convention that allow the injured to seek compensation and the sending state to prosecute criminal wrongs: waiver and settlement.
a. Waiver
Article V, Section 20 solidifies the functional approach of the
UN Convention174 by requiring the Secretary-General to waive
immunity even when an official of the UN has acted within his
official capacity, but where the waiver of immunity is required
so as not to impede the course of justice.175 The authority to
waive immunity has been delegated by the Secretary-General to
the Legal Counsel of the UN.176 In evaluating whether to waive
immunity, the Secretary-General, acting through the Legal
Counsel “consider[s] . . . whether the immunity of any UN official would impede the course of justice and whether it can be
waived without prejudice to the interests of the organization.”177
In the majority of cases reported to the Office of Legal Affairs
immunity has been waived where justice so required.178
174. UN Convention Article V, Section 20 states:
Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interests of
the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals
themselves. The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty
to waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be
waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations. In
the case of the Secretary-General, the Security Council shall have the
right to waive immunity.
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. V, sec. 20.
175. Brower, supra note 137, at 29. See also 1995 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 403-4,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/33 (describing the Secretary-General’s duty to waive
immunity when immunity would impede justice).
176. 1978 U.N. Jurid. Y.B., 191, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/16.
177. PROCEDURES IN PLACE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 8, SECTION 29, OF
THE CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ON 13 FEBRUARY 1946 : REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 12 U.N. Doc. A/C.5/49/65
(1995) [hereinafter UN Settlement Policy]. See also Rawski, supra note 150,
at 112-13 (criticizing the method of waiver under the UN Convention).
178. UN Settlement Policy, supra note 177, at 12. “In a few cases, however,
the Organization has not waived immunity but has cooperated with the competent authorities, on a strictly voluntary basis, by providing, for example, the
necessary information with a view to assisting the authorities in the proper
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The Secretary-General determines in essence what constitutes an official act for the purposes of waiver. This does not
mean, however, that there can be no independent review of the
Secretary-General’s decisions regarding waiver.179 These decisions can be subject to the review of the ICJ.180
Commentator Charles Brower has argued that the ICJ’s ability to review determinations concerning waiver, lends to a genuine legal restriction on the immunities of the UN and its officials.181
b. Settlement
Article VIII, Section 29 permits the UN to settle with claimants.182 When a dispute involves a UN official who has acted in
a private capacity, waiver is not an issue because the official is
in the same position as any other private individual.183 However, if the Secretary-General determines that the official was
acting in an official capacity and that the interests of the organization do not permit a waiver, the UN has traditionally settled with the claimants.184
The settlement process described in Article VIII, Section 29
has been developed with specificity by the UN in its policy
document entitled Procedures in place for implementation of
Article 8, Section 29, of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the UN, adopted by the General Assembly, on 13
February 1946, Report of the Secretary-General.185

administration of justice and preventing the occurrence of any abuse of privileges and immunities.” Id.
179. Brower, supra note 137, at 30–31.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. UN Convention art.VIII, sec. 29 states:
The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of
settlement of: a. disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of
a private law character to which the United Nations is a party; b.
disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of
his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been
waived by the Secretary-General.
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. VIII, sec. 29.
183. ILC Study (1967), supra note 149, ¶ 387.
184. Id.
185. UN Settlement Policy, supra note 177.
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Although the Convention does not specifically provide a
mechanism to deal with claims brought against officials who
have acted in an official capacity, and whose immunity has not
been waived, it does state in Article VIII, Section 29 that the
UN will make provisions for appropriate forms of settlement.186
Additional guidance is provided by Article V, Section 21, which
states that the UN will “cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of Members to facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations
and prevent the occurrence of any abuse in connection with the
privileges, immunities and facilities set out in Article V.”187
Thus, the Convention provides a two-tiered system in which
those injured by UN officials have recourse. They may either
seek a remedy through national courts if the Secretary-General
waives immunity, or settle under the provisions of the UN settlement policy when immunity has not been waived.
IV. A COMPARISON OF DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL
IMMUNITIES
The most striking difference between the UN Convention and
the Vienna Convention is that the former fully employs the
functional necessity theory while the later attempts to implement it, but fails. This difference is evidenced by the two obvious, yet deceiving, similarities between the conventions. Both
have a mechanism for settling disputes and both provide for
waiver of immunity in certain circumstances. However, the
substantive application differs in each because of the competing
theoretical approaches of absolute immunity and functional
immunity.
A. Settlement
Under the privileges and immunities framework set out in
the UN Convention,188 claimants may pursue a remedy by seeking a settlement with the UN when immunity has not been
waived.189 While the UN settlement policy does not specifically
describe what type of settlement will be offered, the organiza186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 12.
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. V, sec. 22.
See supra Part II.
See generally UN Settlement Policy, supra note 177.
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tion does commit to making “appropriate modes of settlement”
available to those who are injured.190 Thus, under the UN
framework, the organization makes settlement available for
claimants who have been injured by UN officials who have retained immunity.191 In those cases in which the UN official does
commit a criminal or civil wrong while acting in his private capacity, he or she is responsible and provisions for settlement are
unnecessary.
In contrast, the system of privileges and immunities in the
Vienna Convention has no provision for private settlement.
While it does provide for settlement under the Optional Protocol, the Protocol only covers disputes between states and not
individuals.192 The Vienna Convention overlooks the costs inflicted on individuals by diplomatic personnel.
B. Waiver
Waiver is the second mechanism used by both Conventions to
assure accountability. Under the UN Convention, the Secretary-General is required to waive the immunity of individuals
who have acted within their official capacity when not doing so
would impede the course of justice.193 This adds another layer
of protection to potential litigants. They are first protected by
the doctrine of functional immunity itself, and in addition,
waiver is available if justice so requires.
While the Vienna Convention does allow the sending state to
waive the immunity of its diplomats, this seldom happens.194
The Vienna Convention’s reliance on the sending state to waive
the immunity of its own diplomat creates an inherent conflict of
interest. The situations in which a diplomat’s immunity may be
waived are usually politically charged, and therefore are not
available for average offenses which harm others.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 12.
Id.
See Optional Protocol, supra note 98.
UN Settlement Policy, supra note 177, at 12.
See supra Part II.E, for a discussion of waiver and settlement.
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V. CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR ENFORCING A FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Diplomatic immunity should be reformed to fully incorporate
the theory of functional necessity and to provide additional
safeguards to potential plaintiffs under this theory. These safeguards include the mechanisms of settlement and waiver implemented under the UN Convention described in Part III.B.
This objective could be accomplished by drafting an additional protocol to the Vienna Convention that permits states to
execute bilateral agreements to limit the immunity of their diplomats to functional immunity.195 By enabling states to opt into
such an agreement, it allows states who truly fear diplomatic
persecution to continue using the regime set forth under the
Vienna Convention. Such a protocol, however, provides an alternative for states that are willing to curtail absolute immunity. If enough states execute such agreements, the functional
approach may, at some point, ripen into a rule of customary
international law, whereby all states would be bound to respect
functional immunity.196 In addition, this approach respects
state sovereignty and allows states to choose how their diplomatic personnel will be treated. It also addresses the issue of
reciprocity, in that states who execute such agreements would
be assured the same treatment for their diplomats in the receiving state.
Such an agreement would not be in derogation of the other
protections and doctrines contained within the Vienna Convention. The agreement would supercede those parts of the Convention dealing with absolute immunity, while respecting those
sections providing other protections.197

195. There is some precedent for these kinds of bilateral agreements. For
example, the U.S. has negotiated such agreements with other states to prohibit the surrender of U.S. nationals to the International Criminal Court.
Although the reasons for these agreements have been controversial, they
serve as a possible model. See Jennifer Trahan & Andrew Egan, U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal Court, 30 HUM. RTS. 10 (2003) (for a discussion of these agreements).
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987).
197. There are several articles of the Vienna Convention that confer protection of diplomatic premises, and inviolability of diplomatic correspondence.
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The lesson to be learned from the UN Convention is that it
fully implements functional immunity, but at the same time
provides additional safeguards to assure that this limited immunity is not abused. Thus, these bilateral agreements, to be
truly useful and to provide the injured with recourse, must provide the additional protections of waiver and settlement conferred by the UN Convention.
In situations where a diplomat is protected by functional immunity, but where waiver may be required to assure that justice is done, a non-political system of determining whether to
waive must be established. The sending state and receiving
state would have to develop a procedure whereby the representatives of each have input into the decision of whether to waive
functional immunity. This would mitigate the fear that immunity was being waived in order to politically persecute the diplomat. If a dispute did arise between states as to whether to
waive immunity, such a question could be referred to the ICJ.
As is the case under the UN Convention, the ICJ may review
waiver decisions of the Secretary-General, thereby creating a
genuine restraint on immunity.198 In addition, because the ICJ
is already empowered under the Optional Protocol to hear disputes among states regarding diplomatic immunity, it would be
in the best position to help decide questions regarding the
granting of a waiver.
These agreements must also call for settlement funds to be
established so that if individuals are harmed by a diplomat performing official acts, they may still recover for their injuries.
If states implement these mechanisms, diplomats will be held
accountable for their actions, when both acting in a private and
official capacity. Justice so requires.
Veronica L. Maginnis∗

These provisions would be unaffected by such an agreement because they do
not implicate the doctrine of diplomatic immunity.
198. See Brower, supra note 137, at 31.
∗ The author wishes to thank everyone who provided guidance in the
preparation of this Note, especially Richard Erwine and Karen Byrnes. I
would like to dedicate this Note to my parents Thomas and Silvia Maginnis.

